Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression<=
/h1>
By: Daniel M. Wegner
Trinity University
David J. Schneider
University of Texas at San Antonio
Samuel R. Carter III
Trinity University
Teri L. White
Trinity University
Acknowledgement: We thank C=
laudia Serrano, Susan Shackelford, Debbie Shearer, and Sharon Thoms for =
help in conducting this research, and Toni Giuliano, Paul Paulus, James =
W. Pennebaker, Thomas Pyszczynski, and William B. Swann, Jr., for their =
suggestions.
Correspondence concerning this artic=
le should be addressed to: Daniel M. Wegner, Department of Psyc=
hology, Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas 78284
Consciousness cannot produce a negation except in the form o=
f consciousness of negation.Sartre, =
Being and Nothingness
(1956, p. 43)
It is sometimes tempting to wish one's thoug=
hts away. Unpleasant thoughts, ideas that are inappropriate to the momen=
t, or images that may instigate unwanted behaviors each can become the f=
ocus of a desire for avoidance. Whether one is trying not to think of a =
traumatic event, however, or is merely attempting to avoid the thought o=
f food while on a diet, it seems that thought suppression is not easy. I=
t is said, for instance, that when the young Dostoyevski challenged his =
brother not to think of a white bear, the child was perplexed for a long=
while. Contemporary psychology has not focused much inquiry on such puz=
zling yet important phenomena, and our research was designed to initiate=
such investigation.
The Pr=
oblem of Thought Suppression
The idea that people may have unwanted thoug=
hts was one of Freud's fundamental insights, and his notion that people =
repress such thoughts has long served as a theoretical rallying point in=
the study of psychopathology (Erdelyi & Goldberg, 1=
979
; =
Hart, 1934). Still, classical psychoanalytic theor=
y skirts the most vexing problem of thought suppression: the self-refere=
nt quality of the plan to suppress. To suppress a thought requires that =
one (a) plan to suppress a thought and (b) carry out that plan by suppre=
ssing all manifestations of the thought, including the original plan. Th=
ought suppression thus seems to entail a state of knowing and not knowin=
g at once. =
Freud (1915/1957)
made this strange dissociated state theoretically possible by postulat=
ing the unconscious and by further specifying that the unconscious was c=
apable of performing the thought suppression for consciousness. So, alth=
ough the unconscious could not remove the thought from itself, and consc=
iousness also could not remove the thought from itself, the unconscious =
could perform this housecleaning for the separate, conscious part of the=
mind.
The psychoanalytic emphasis on such unconsci=
ous repression has resulted in a longstanding bias against the examinati=
on of consciousness during processes of thought suppression. Rather, the=
process of suppression has been expected to be observable only after th=
e fact, leaving its mark on memory. Thus, even contemporary research inv=
estigates directed forgetting (e.g., =
Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983) and posthyp=
notic amnesia (e.g., =
Kihlstrom, 1983) rather than directed inattention =
or directed conscious avoidance. These lines of investigation do not att=
empt to explain how or with what effect people go about the conscious ta=
sk of suppressing a thought. Yet there are multiple instances in everyda=
y life when this is precisely what people try to do. Trying not to think=
about an upcoming stressful event, avoiding thoughts of smoking while t=
rying to quit, or putting persistent thoughts of a lost love out of mind=
are common experiences for many. Worries of every kind are similarly co=
nscious thoughts that people express the desire not to have. What happen=
s when people make a conscious effort to avoid a particular thought?
=
Although the evidence is sketchy, there is s=
ome indication that the task of conscious thought suppression can be dif=
ficult. Early studies by =
McGranahan (1940)
and Sears and Virshup (cited in =
Sears, 1943) showed that people instructed to avoi=
d making color associations to stimulus words often reported such associ=
ations nonetheless, even when threatened with shock for doing so. In the=
se cases, of course, people did not know in advance the specific thought=
they were to suppress, only the general category of colors. More recent=
ly, =
Logan (1983)
examined patterns of reaction time to stop signals given as subjects p=
erformed brief tasks, and found that although actions can be stopped in =
midcourse, thoughts seem to run to their conclusion as long as the stimu=
li activating them are present. Consistent with this, but only broadly r=
elevant, are the outcome studies of the thought-stopping therapy techniq=
ue. This therapy, suggested by =
Wolpe and Lazarus (1966)
for obsessional disorders, appears generally no more successful than n=
o intervention at all (Reed, 1985).
Another line of evidence arises in research =
that calls for people to ignore information that is relevant to a judgme=
nt they must make. Whether people are instructed to ignore the informati=
on before they encounter it (e.g., =
Wegner, Coulton, & Wenzlaff, 1985) or are told=
to disregard it afterwards (e.g., =
Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975), they tend to i=
ncorporate it into subsequent judgments nonetheless. Jurors are influenc=
ed by information they have been instructed to disregard (Thompson, Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981), media audiences are influe=
nced by news they are told is untrue (Wegner, Wenzlaff,=
Kerker, & Beattie, 1981), and people judging odds are influence=
d by information even when they have been offered money to ignore it (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These effects would se=
em unlikely if people could will away their conscious experience of the =
thoughts they were instructed to ignore (cf. =
Sherman & Corty, 1984). The hypothesis suggest=
ed by a diverse array of findings to date, then, is that conscious thoug=
ht suppression is not a cognitive transformation that people perform wit=
h great facility.
Conse=
quences of Thought Suppression
The mental state produced by an attempt at t=
hought suppression seems to differ in several ways from that accompanyin=
g simple inattention or unintended distraction. The hypothesis suggested=
by several theorists is that attempts to suppress thoughts (or emotions=
) can result in a subsequent rebound of absorption with those topics. Th=
e prototypic study in this area (Janis, 1958) showe=
d that individuals who are personally inclined to avoid thinking about a=
n upcoming surgery subsequently exhibit more anxious reactions to it. Al=
though the meaning of this finding still is in debate (e.g., =
Janis, 1983
; =
Lazarus, 1983), there is a degree of theoretical u=
nanimity in the conclusion that avoiding a stressful thought can lead to=
subsequent intrusions of that thought (e.g., =
Horowitz, 1975). Even recent research in this doma=
in continues to depend on the preselection of subjects who are prone to =
suppress (e.g., =
Burstein & Meichenbaum, 1979), however, and for=
this reason the processes underlying any transition from suppression to=
absorption remain unexamined.
The possibility that thought suppression lea=
ds to absorption can also be found in the reactions people have to absti=
nence from food or addictive substances. Given the assumption that the a=
ttempt to avoid a habitual behavior is commonly preceded by attempts to =
suppress or avoid habit-related thoughts, the pattern of behavior follow=
ing self-control attempts is informative about the pattern of thinking t=
hat may take place. In the case of abstinence from food, for instance, =
Polivy and Herman (1985)
indicated that dieting generally causes subsequent overeating. They ci=
te several converging sources of evidence suggesting that the restraint =
of eating is a reliable precursor of binge eating and overweight. It see=
ms, then, that the attempt to avoid thoughts of food may lead to a later=
preoccupation with such thoughts. The more general abstinence-violation=
effect observed by =
Marlatt and Parks (1982)
suggests that the state of abstinence is a precarious one, in that rel=
apse to an addictive behavior can be triggered by a single, seemingly mi=
nor violation of the prohibition. This, too, is consistent with the idea=
that an initial attempt to suppress thoughts can be followed by an unus=
ual preoccupation with the suppressed thought domain. Their observation =
suggests further that the event that serves to halt suppression and trig=
ger relapse may be only a single occurrence that draws the person's atte=
ntion to the originally suppressed thought.
The tentative conclusions suggested by past =
findings are two-fold. First, it seems that thought suppression is diffi=
cult for people to do; the conscious avoidance of a thought may be perpl=
exing and even time consuming. Second, there is some evidence to suggest=
that even when thoughts can be suppressed, they may return to conscious=
ness with minimal prompting, perhaps to become obsessive preoccupations.=
These general expectations were explored here in two experiments throug=
h the expedient of asking people to suppress a thought while they delive=
red stream-of-consciousness reports in a laboratory setting.
Experiment 1
Method
Subjects and design
Trinity University undergraduates (14 men an=
d 20 women) in introductory psychology classes volunteered to participat=
e in return for extra class credit. Each was randomly assigned to one of=
two experimental conditions, an =
initial suppression
condition or an =
initial expression
condition. These conditions differed only in the order of two experime=
ntal tasks. For initial suppression, the subject was first instructed to=
suppress a thought, and then to express it; for initial expression, the=
se instructions were given in reverse order.
Procedure
Each subject participated individually, star=
ting by reading a set of instructions on how to report one's stream of c=
onsciousness. The instructions were adapted from those used by =
Pope (1978)
and were fashioned to encourage continuous verbalization. The instruct=
ions asked only for subjects to describe what they were thinking; there =
was no special appeal for the subject to explain or justify the thought =
(cf. =
Ericcson & Simon, 1984).
The participant then was asked and gave info=
rmed consent to spend several 5-min periods alone reporting to a tape re=
corder =E2=80=9Ceverything that comes to mind.=E2=80=9D For each period,=
it was explained that the experimenter would say =E2=80=9Cbegin=E2=80=9D=
and then leave the room for the duration of the period. After one such =
practice period, the experimenter returned to issue additional instructi=
ons. Participants assigned to the initial suppression group were told th=
e following:
=
In the next five minutes, please verbalize your thoughts as =
you did before, with one exception. This time, try not to think of a whi=
te bear. Every time you say “white bear” or have “w=
hite bear” come to mind, though, please ring the bell on the tabl=
e before you.
Following this, these participants were given expression instructions =
for a subsequent period; they were asked for an additional 5 min to =E2=80=
=9Ctry to think of a white bear.=E2=80=9D Their task description was oth=
erwise identical to the first, in that they were asked to continue ringi=
ng the bell to indicate each instance of the thought. The participants a=
ssigned to the initial expression group were given these instructions in=
reverse order; they were asked in the initial period to try to think of=
a white bear and in the subsequent period to try not to think of a whit=
e bear.
Results
Analysis of the tape recordings was made for=
(a) bell rings occurring simultaneously with audible mentions of =E2=80=
=9Cwhite bear,=E2=80=9D (b) bell rings occurring alone, and (c) mentions=
occurring alone. Intercoder reliability between a pair of coders averag=
ed .94 over the three measures. =
Table 1
shows the means for each measure by condition.
![3D"psp=](3D"http://0-= "3D\"Experiment")
Experiment 1: Measures of Thought by Group and Period
A 2 (initial suppression vs. initial express=
ion group) =C3=97 2 (suppression period vs. expression period) =C3=97 3 =
(thought measure) analysis of variance (
ANOVA
) was conducted on transformed thought token scores. A square root tran=
sformation was made to achieve homogeneity of error variance in this ana=
lysis (Kirk, 1968, pp. 63=E2=80=9365), but for clar=
ity, the reported means are not transformed.
Tokens of thought were more prevalent in the=
expression periods than in the suppression periods. The mean of the sum=
med thought measures during expression was 19.22, and this was significa=
ntly greater than the suppression mean of 6.78, =
=
F
(1, 32)
=3D 41.01, =
p
< .0001
. Despite this difference, it is noteworthy that suppression was never =
complete. Participants indicated thinking about a white bear (through a =
bell ring, mention, or both) more than once per minute even when directl=
y instructed to try not to think of a white bear.
Tokens of thought were more frequent in the =
expression period following initial suppression than in the initial expr=
ession period. A significant interaction of initial instruction and peri=
od, =
=
F
(1, 32)
=3D 4.79, =
p
< .05
, was comprised of a significant simple main effect of initial instruct=
ion group in the expression period, =
=
F
(1, 32)
=3D 5.05, =
p
< .05
. A similar effect was not observed in the suppression period following=
initial expression, =
=
F
(1, 32)
< 1
, indicating an unusual asymmetry: Initial suppression appears to produ=
ce a rebound effect, a surge in the frequency of subsequent thought abou=
t the white bear during the expression period.
Evidence of a rebound following suppression =
also arose in correlational analyses conducted within groups. As would b=
e predicted on the basis of a straightforward individual differences int=
erpretation, the total number of thought tokens for a subject in the two=
time periods (expression and suppression) was positively correlated amo=
ng subjects in the initial expression group, =
=
r
(17)
=3D .55, =
p
< .02
. This was not the case, however, in the initial suppression group. Her=
e, a zero-order correlation indicated an antagonistic relation between t=
hinking of a white bear during suppression and thinking of it during the=
subsequent expression period. This value, =
=
r
(17)
=3D =E2=88=92.10
, was not significantly different from zero but was significantly small=
er than the .55 value observed in the other condition (
p
< .01). In the initial suppression group, then, success at the init=
ial suppression task created a readiness for later expression, one that =
significantly attenuated the more usual tendency for people who express =
their thoughts at one time to express them at another.
A further indication of the rebound effect w=
as observed in the course of thought occurrences over the 5-min periods.=
This phenomenon was encountered when a reanalysis of the tapes, by 1-mi=
n segments, was made for total bell rings. (Missing data for this analys=
is resulting from slightly short final 1-min segments for 6 subjects, 3 =
in each group, were replaced by each subject's total for the prior 1-min=
segment.) As shown in =
Figure 1
, bell rings per minute increased over time during the expression perio=
d in the initial suppression group. This would be unremarkable except th=
at bell rings per minute decreased over time in every other measurement =
period: in the initial expression group for both expression and suppress=
ion periods and in the initial suppression group for the suppression per=
iod.
Figure 1. Bell rings per min over the 5-min periods<=
/span>
A 2 (initial instruction group) =C3=97 2 (pe=
riod) =C3=97 5 (1-min segment) =
ANOVA
on square root transformed total bell rings indicated that this trend =
interaction was reliable. There was a significant three-way interaction =
of group, period, and linear orthogonal polynomial trend over time segme=
nts, =
=
F
(1, 31)
=3D 7.02, =
p
< .02
. Participants who were allowed to express a thought they had recently =
suppressed developed an accelerating tendency to report the thought, ove=
rcoming the more usual progressive disinterest or fatigue displayed by p=
articipants in other periods.
The stream-of-consciousness protocols reveal=
ed some interesting facets of the thought-suppression process that are n=
ot evident in the counting of thought tokens. The protocols made it clea=
r, for example, that many of the subjects saw the thought-suppression ta=
sk as difficult or puzzling from the outset. Many also verbalized a stra=
tegy soon after encountering the task, saying to themselves, in effect, =
=E2=80=9COkay, so I'll think of something else.=E2=80=9D Perhaps most in=
teresting, then, was the manner in which thoughts of the white bear retu=
rned to subjects when they were reciting their various replacements for =
the thought. White-bear mentions and bell rings almost invariably occurr=
ed when the subject had finished a sentence or a thought and was silent.=
During suppression, subjects were generally able to keep from thinking =
about the target thought, or at least were able to keep from reporting i=
t, as long as they were verbalizing the thought of something else. These=
sorts of thought intrusions were not common, however, during the expres=
sion periods. Here, mentions and bell rings typically occurred in the co=
ntext of subjects' meaningful narratives about white bears.
The observed effects have been examined in s=
ubsequent studies varying several parameters of the experimental design.=
In one such investigation, =
Shackelford, Wegner, and Schneider (1987)
arranged for three groups of 10 subjects each to participate in experi=
mental conditions like those of the initial suppression group in this st=
udy. One group participated in an exact replication, whereas the other g=
roups participated with either (a) no bell, and verbalization serving as=
the thought measure, or (b) no verbalization required, and the bell alo=
ne serving as the thought measure. The different metrics used in these g=
roups make mean comparisons between groups problematic, but the zero-ord=
er correlation between thought tokens measured during suppression and su=
bsequent expression was replicated for all groups (each =
r
< .07). These findings thus cast doubt on the possibility that the =
bell-ringing requirement in the original study had any special influence=
on the occurrence of the rebound effect.
One other follow-up study by =
Carter, Wegner, and Schneider (1987)
is worth noting in that it showed what may be an important limiting co=
ndition for the finding that people have trouble suppressing thoughts. I=
n this research, the tendency to report thinking of the to-be-suppressed=
thought during the suppression period was reliably reduced when subject=
s were given no chance to practice verbalizing the stream of consciousne=
ss before they began the suppression task. It may be that subjects must =
be comfortable making such reports before they will admit to suppression=
difficulty, or perhaps the initial reporting helps people set aside the=
ir immediate concerns in the setting and get involved in the experimenta=
l task.
Discussion
The paradoxical effect of thought suppressio=
n is that it produces a preoccupation with the suppressed thought. These=
findings suggest that the task of suppressing a thought is itself diffi=
cult, leading people to hold the thought in consciousness repeatedly eve=
n as they try to eliminate it. When they are then released from the supp=
ression task and asked instead to go ahead and express the thought, they=
do so at an accelerated rate, mentioning it more often than if they had=
simply been asked to express the thought from the start. There are thus=
both immediate and delayed tendencies toward conscious preoccupation wi=
th the very thought that is being suppressed.
Potential explanations for these two effects=
can be derived from several psychological theories. As noted earlier, p=
sychoanalytic theory is not clear regarding the process or consequence o=
f conscious suppression, and although some ideas might be gleaned from t=
he Freudian version of unconscious repression, they are not strictly app=
licable to the present case. This is particularly true given the nature =
of the thought that subjects were asked to suppress in this study. Psych=
oanalytic interpretations are commonly extended only to cases of the for=
getting or avoidance of threatening or stressful thoughts (Holmes, 1974), and white bears are generally nonthreatening this=
side of the Arctic Circle.
It may be possible to assimilate these findi=
ngs to the theory of psychological reactance (Brehm, 196=
6). Because the person in the rebound period is doing the opposite o=
f what the experimenter requested in the suppression period, one might a=
rgue that reactance was aroused by the suppression task. By this logic, =
the experimenter's instruction to avoid thinking of a white bear restric=
ted the subject's freedom to do so, and this restriction made the though=
t more attractive. Thus, the subject tends to dwell on the thought in th=
e suppression period, and once given the freedom to return to the though=
t in the expression period, becomes preoccupied with it.
The difficulty with this interpretation come=
s when we try to understand why a negative injunction should create more=
reactance than a positive one. After all, the subjects in the initial e=
xpression condition also had their freedom restricted; they were told to=
think of a white bear. Reactance predicts that they would avoid thinkin=
g of a white bear during the expression period, as they did (as compared=
with subjects in the expression period of the initial suppression condi=
tion). But it would also predict that initial expression subjects would =
be motivated to avoid the thought during the subsequent suppression peri=
od and would do so more than the subjects in the initial suppression con=
dition. Such an effect should be of roughly the same magnitude as the re=
bound phenomenon observed in the initial suppression condition. This did=
not happen, and the reactance explanation thus falls short of a full ex=
plication of these findings.
Another framework that could be applied here=
is self-perception theory (Bem, 1972). This theory =
does not seem relevant to the initial difficulty people have in suppress=
ing thoughts, but it does offer a prediction in line with some of the re=
bound evidence. The theory says that a person who performs a behavior in=
the presence of external constraints will perform that behavior more of=
ten later when the constraints are removed. The experimenter's request t=
o suppress thoughts of a white bear is indeed an external constraint, an=
d because people find themselves thinking of white bears despite this co=
nstraint, they might develop a self-perceived positive attitude toward t=
he activity of thinking of white bears. This idea also predicts, however=
, that people would think about a white bear in the subsequent expressio=
n period to the degree that they had disobeyed the external constraint a=
nd thought about a white bear in the prior suppression period. This was =
not the case, as a zero-order correlation was observed between thought f=
requencies in the two periods among initial suppression subjects. So sel=
f-perception theory fails to capture an important facet of these data.
The proper explanation of the thought-suppre=
ssion effects appears to require the development of some new theoretical=
ideas. We have devised a framework consistent with several key features=
of the observed effects, and we provide one test of this framework in t=
he following study.
Experiment 2
The results of the first experiment may be u=
nderstood through an analysis of the process of self-distraction. Essent=
ially, the individual who is faced with the task of suppressing a though=
t is given a negative cue for subsequent thinking, an instruction of wha=
t to avoid rather than an instruction of what to approach. This means th=
at there is no single item for attention; there is, for instance, no one=
such thing as =
not white bear
. This general idea can be helpful for understanding both the initial d=
ifficulty of suppression and the source of the subsequent rebound.
Suppression is difficult because thinking wi=
thout focus is difficult. The person engaging in self-distraction turns =
to thoughts of many things. The person's attention may range over a wide=
expanse of mental territory, but in considering such items the person m=
ay find little that is quickly absorbing and that suggests a new line of=
thought. For example, a person using =
white bear
as a negative cue might say, =E2=80=9CI'll think about the light switc=
h instead.=E2=80=9D The light switch is the focal point for a moment, bu=
t it turns out on examination to be less than intriguing. The person's a=
ttention may drift to something else, or perhaps more commonly, the pers=
on consults in memory the most recently occurring definition of the task=
at hand=E2=80=94in effect, asking =E2=80=9CWhat am I doing?=E2=80=9D Wh=
en this happens, of course, the person is often reminded of a white bear=
and must begin again. This circular process may underlie the difficulty=
of self-distraction. Using a negative cue for thought tends to distract=
the person from the current mental task toward anything else, and the p=
erson who has so much of nothing in particular to consider then consults=
memory about what should be done to find a reminder and thus begin agai=
n.
Although the negative cuing task does not pr=
oduce effective suppression, it is effective in producing another import=
ant cognitive change. All the things the person is thinking about during=
this task become associated with the negative cue. That is, the person =
comes to see present stimuli (e.g., the room, experimenter, etc.) as wel=
l as thoughts retrieved from memory as related to the negative cue. Thes=
e things are =
not white bears
. Such a connection to all ongoing thoughts is not produced by the comp=
lementary instruction to think of a white bear, however, because the per=
son given this positive cue is likely to explore only a limited range of=
possible thought topics: those directly relevant to white bears. During=
expression, subjects talk of zoos, the North Pole, big black noses, and=
the like. Thinking about a white bear can be carried out successfully m=
erely by rehearsing ideas found in memory that are already associatively=
linked to white bears. And indeed, thinking about other items in the ro=
om or entertaining other ongoing thoughts during expression would probab=
ly be identified by the subject as a failure to persevere at the experim=
ental task. Negative cuing, in this light, brings many more new topics o=
f thought into the class of things that are contrasted with (and thereby=
linked associatively to) the thought to be suppressed than does a proce=
ss of simple concentration or directed thinking.
Negatively cued associations are not likely =
to be very strong, however, and may not be sufficient to remind the pers=
on of white bears very frequently (cf. =
Semin & Rosch, 1981). Because the person is no=
t consciously trying to learn this association, an implicit rather than =
an explicit association is formed (Graf & Schacter,=
1985). Later, however, when the injunction to avoid white-bear thou=
ghts is lifted and the person is invited to think of white bears, the pr=
ior negative-cuing facilitates the task of continuing to think about whi=
te bears. Everything in the room, and in recent memory, is now imbued wi=
th a slight degree of =
not white bear
ness, and thoughts of white bears are thus implicitly primed by many on=
going conscious thoughts. The negative-cuing explanation of thought-supp=
ression effects, in sum, indicates that the task of stopping a thought h=
as the effect of producing associations of that thought with many other =
thoughts immediately available to the person, and that these association=
s function to make the thought rebound when the injunction to avoid the =
thought is no longer in effect.
The negative-cuing interpretation of thought=
suppression provides some further predictions on the nature of suppress=
ion effects. It suggests, for instance, that rebound effects should be l=
argely eliminated if the person uses a positive cue for self-distraction=
during suppression. The attempt to think of just one replacement for th=
e avoided thought rather than many might not keep the person deeply inte=
rested, and so might not reduce the initial difficulty of suppression=E2=
=80=94but it could very well short-circuit the rebound. With a single di=
stracter for the to-be-suppressed thought, the person would not later be=
reminded of the thought by many other cues and so would not be as likel=
y to become preoccupied with it during the expression period. This idea =
was tested in this experiment.
Method
Subjects
Undergraduates from Trinity University and f=
rom San Antonio College (16 men and 38 women) volunteered to participate=
, with the Trinity students receiving extra credit in introductory psych=
ology classes for their participation. Tape recordings for 5 subjects we=
re not clearly audible and their data were not included.
Design and procedure
The subjects were randomly assigned to three=
experimental conditions. Two of these were exact replications of the in=
itial expression and initial suppression conditions of Experiment 1. The=
third was identical to the initial suppression condition with one excep=
tion: Subjects in this =
focused distraction
condition were asked to distract themselves during initial suppression=
by means of a single positive cue, the thought of a red Volkswagen. The=
y were told after the suppression instruction, =E2=80=9CAlso, if you do =
happen to think of a white bear, please try to think of a red Volkswagen=
instead.=E2=80=9D No further mention of the red Volkswagen was made dur=
ing the remainder of the experiment for these subjects.
Results
Analysis of the tape recordings was made for=
the same variables examined in the first study (bell rings occurring wi=
th mentions of a white bear, bell rings occurring alone, and mentions oc=
curring alone), and in addition for (a) duration in seconds of discussio=
n about a white bear, (b) mentions of a red Volkswagen, and (c) duration=
in seconds of discussion of a red Volkswagen. Intercoder reliability be=
tween a pair of coders averaged .96 for the thought-occurrence measures =
(i.e., bells and mentions) and .86 for the thought-duration measures.
An initial attempt was made to use repeated =
measures =
ANOVA
s paralleling those of Experiment 1. In that study, we were able to sol=
ve the problem of significant heterogeneity of error variance in such an=
alyses by the use of a square root data transformation. The same transfo=
rmation did not achieve homogeneity of error variance in this experiment=
, and all repeated measures analyses were therefore disallowed. With the=
square root transformation, however, homogeneity was obtained in three-=
group between-subjects =
ANOVA
s, and these were thus conducted for each of two thought measures: an o=
verall measure of thought occurrence and the measure of thought duration=
. =
Table 2
shows raw scores for mean number of thought occurrences (sum of bell r=
ings, mentions of a white bear, and bells with simultaneous mentions) an=
d the mean thought duration in the suppression and expression periods fo=
r each group.
Experiment 2: Measures of Thought by Group and Period
Suppression period
As in Experiment 1, subjects in this study f=
ound suppression difficult. Across all conditions, subjects indicated th=
inking of a white bear 6.15 times in the 5-min suppression period. Subje=
cts' preoccupation was significantly greater in the initial suppression =
group than in the initial expression group, overall =
=
F
(2, 46)
=3D 4.54, =
p
< .02
, with the Newman-Keuls comparison for this difference at =
p
< .05. This did not occur in the prior study, and it is not clear w=
hy such a result appeared here. The overall tendency for white-bear thou=
ghts to occur during suppression was not reliably reduced in the focused=
-distraction group. So, although these subjects mentioned red Volkswagen=
s often (
M
=3D 3.00), they still kept thinking of a white bear during suppression=
at a rate equivalent to that of subjects in the other groups.
The thought-duration measure indicates that =
subjects across all conditions talked about a white bear for a mean of 8=
.65 s in the suppression period. Thus, it seems that the occurrences of =
the thought during suppression were relatively brief, averaging 1.41 s e=
ach. This duration is consistent with our observation in the prior study=
that thoughts of the item to be suppressed intrude on the verbal stream=
in only an abbreviated way during suppression. There was no significant=
variation in the duration of white-bear thoughts across conditions (
F
< 1). By this measure, then, suppression in the three groups was ge=
nerally equivalent.
The mean duration of thought about a red Vol=
kswagen in the focused-distraction condition was 20.76 s, the equivalent=
of 6.92 s per mention. This suggests that subjects in this condition to=
ok seriously their task of focusing on this distracter.
Expression period
Thought occurrence during expression (as sho=
wn in =
Table 2
) was significantly influenced by group, =
=
F
(2, 46)
=3D 4.62, =
p
< .02
. Newman-Keuls comparisons indicated that the initial suppression group=
mean was reliably greater than the mean for the initial expression grou=
p, =
p
< .05. Thus, the general finding of a rebound effect in Experiment =
1 was replicated. (The temporal trends observed in that study, shown in =
Figure 1
, were not tested here as the result of the heterogeneity of error-vari=
ance problem. Inspection of means suggested that the trend for increasin=
g thought over time during expression in the initial suppression group w=
as not as pronounced as in the prior study.) The mean level of thought o=
ccurrence during expression in the focused distraction group was signifi=
cantly less than the comparable mean in the initial suppression group (
p
< .05). This indicates that the rebound effect for thought occurren=
ces was reliably reduced in the focused-distraction group.
Thought duration during expression exhibited=
a marginally significant group effect, =
=
F
(2, 46)
=3D 3.01, =
p
< .06
. The differences between means reflected the same pattern as that obse=
rved for the thought-occurrence measure: The initial suppression group s=
howed a tendency toward a rebound effect, in that its level during expre=
ssion was elevated over that of the initial expression group; the focuse=
d-distraction group, in turn, showed a tendency for the rebound to disap=
pear, in that its level during expression resembled that of the initial =
expression group.
Correlations within groups<=
/p>
As in the prior study, correlations were cal=
culated between thought-occurrence scores for subjects in the expression=
and suppression periods. These correlations revealed a pattern of indiv=
idual variation consistent with the prior study. Subjects' inclination t=
o note thought occurrences was significantly correlated between the expr=
ession and suppression periods for subjects in the initial expression gr=
oup (
r
=3D .50, =
p
< .02). This correlation was nonsignificant in the initial suppress=
ion group (
r
=3D .23, =
p
> .18). Although these correlations are not reliably different, the=
ir relative magnitudes replicate the pattern observed in Experiment 1 an=
d reveal a tendency toward rebound only under conditions of initial supp=
ression.
By this correlational measure of the rebound=
effect, focused distraction eliminated the rebound. The correlation bet=
ween thought occurrences in the suppression and expression periods for s=
ubjects performing the focused distraction was significant (
r
=3D .55, =
p
< .02). Thus, the usual tendency for thought-occurrence measures to=
be correlated was found here even when subjects engaged in suppression =
before expression. Apparently, the technique of turning to one distracte=
r=E2=80=94in this case, the red Volkswagen=E2=80=94is sufficient to erad=
icate this indication of a suppression-induced rebound in thought. Paral=
lel correlational analyses that were conducted with the duration measure=
s exhibited a similar pattern but no significant correlations in any con=
dition.
Among subjects in the focused-distraction gr=
oup during suppression, mentioning a red Volkswagen tended to be correla=
ted with indications of white-bear thought occurrence (
r
=3D .41, =
p
< .06). A partial correlation taking into account the relation betw=
een white-bear thought occurrences in the suppression and expression con=
ditions showed that mentioning a red Volkswagen during suppression was n=
ot reliably related to the level of white-bear thought occurrence during=
subsequent expression (partial =
r
=3D .33, =
ns
). The negative-cuing hypothesis predicts a negative correlation here, =
but it is difficult to discern whether this finding represents an anomal=
y for the hypothesis or an effect of insufficient within-group sample si=
ze for statistical inference.
Discussion
The results of this study are consistent wit=
h those of Experiment 1 in suggesting that suppression is difficult and =
that it has reliable effects on subsequent thinking. The ability of subj=
ects to suppress the thought of a white bear was not in strong evidence =
here, as subjects tended to note the thought's occurrence more than once=
a minute even as they were attempting to suppress it. This was true als=
o among subjects given a focused distraction, the instruction to think o=
f a red Volkswagen whenever a white bear came to mind.
The rebound phenomenon observed in Experimen=
t 1 was found in this study as well. Subjects who initially suppressed t=
he white-bear thought and then were allowed to express it showed an elev=
ated tendency to report its occurrence during their expression opportuni=
ty. Subjects in this initial suppression group, as it happened, also exh=
ibited a significant elevation in their degree of thought occurrence dur=
ing suppression relative to the other groups, and this finding raises th=
e possibility that subjects in this group were merely more inclined to r=
eport thought occurrences than were subjects in the other groups. The me=
asure of thought duration, however, showed no such pattern, indicating i=
nstead a relative but nonsignificant lack of concern with the white bear=
during suppression for initial suppression subjects. Yet, by this measu=
re, a marginally significant tendency toward a rebound was observed in t=
he initial suppression group during the expression period. In addition, =
the correlation pattern between thought occurrences in the initial suppr=
ession and initial expression groups paralleled the pattern of Experimen=
t 1. On balance, then, it can be concluded that general trends of the fi=
rst study were replicated in this one.
The negative-cuing hypothesis devised to acc=
ount for the observations of the first study was tested here. This accou=
nt holds that subjects in a focused-distraction group might defeat a rec=
urrent inclination to think about anything other than white bear by focu=
sing on the single distracter provided them. This should, in turn, reduc=
e the degree to which (negatively cued) associations are formed between =
the white bear and other current thoughts and so reduce the likelihood t=
hat subsequent continuations of these current thoughts would prime the i=
dea of the white bear during the later expression period. As predicted b=
y this hypothesis, focused distraction during suppression in this experi=
ment produced a significant attenuation of the rebound effect. Subjects =
in the condition receiving these special instructions exhibited patterns=
of thinking largely indistinguishable from those of subjects in the ini=
tial expression group and significantly different from those of subjects=
in the initial suppression group.
This is but a first outing for the negative-=
cuing hypothesis, of course, and further inquiry will be needed to deter=
mine whether it serves as an adequate account of the rebound phenomenon.=
The hypothesis also predicts, for example, that the rebound might be el=
iminated by dissociating the contexts in which suppression and expressio=
n are performed. People who try not to think about a white bear in one c=
ontext would form negatively cued associations to a white bear only in t=
hat context. On moving to a different context, their constellation of on=
going thoughts would change, with far fewer thoughts now priming a white=
bear, and the rebound might be defeated. The relief from old worries on=
e sometimes experiences on traveling to a new environment might be an ex=
ample of this.
Focused distraction also has its everyday eq=
uivalents. More than one person has attempted to find comfort in the fac=
e of unwanted thoughts by appealing to a single distracter, be it a bare=
light bulb, a religious icon, or perhaps even a red Volkswagen. The res=
ults of this study suggest that there may be a certain use in turning to=
a familiar talisman in the pursuit of mental peace. Although the distra=
cter may not ease the current task of suppression, it could block negati=
ve cuing and so serve the welcome purpose of reducing later resurgence o=
f the suppressed thought.
General Discussion
The results of these experiments suggest tha=
t the portrayal of suppression as the parent of obsession may contain a =
degree of truth. The process begins when a person attempts to put a part=
icular thought out of mind. This need not be an especially obnoxious or =
unnerving thought=E2=80=94even the thought of a white bear will do. The =
person finds the thought hard to suppress and may soon wonder why this p=
articular thought is so insistent. Continued suppression may eventually =
remove the thought from mind, for the present. Then, however, some remin=
der occurs, and in a moment of weakness the person gives license to the =
rumination. Our results suggest that in this moment, an unusual preoccup=
ation with the formerly suppressed thought may begin. This preoccupation=
may grow and prosper in the person's mind. And quite ironically, the pe=
rson who is first most successful in carrying out the suppression may ev=
entually be most susceptible to the resulting obsession.
The momentum imparted to thought by an act o=
f suppression has long been known, or at least suspected, in many quarte=
rs of psychology. The idea that there is danger in keeping things bottle=
d up inside has surfaced in a variety of forms. =
Lindemann (1944), for example, suggested that grie=
ving follows this rule; he argued that suppression can produce an insuff=
icient amount of grief work and so can impair coping by the bereaved. Si=
milar formulations promote emotional catharsis of many sorts, from letti=
ng out aggressive impulses to working through pent-up feelings in relati=
onships. Such an antisuppression model appears to be an exaggerated gene=
ralization of psychoanalytic ideas (cf. =
Freud, 1914/1958), and although it is widely advoca=
ted in popular psychology channels, it has to date remained largely unfo=
rmulated in psychological theory and unsupported in laboratory settings =
(e.g., =
Geen & Quanty, 1977).
This picture of neglect and negative evidenc=
e is now changing, however, suggesting the beginnings of a new psycholog=
y of suppression. The work of =
Pennebaker (1985)
is notable in this regard, showing in several field investigations tha=
t the suppression or inhibition of emotional and cognitive reactions to =
traumatic events may yield physiological changes and subsequent health p=
roblems. A related line of inquiry by =
Silver, Boon, and Stones (1983)
suggests that suppression may block a natural tendency to find meaning=
in traumatic events and that this can hamper effective coping processes=
. These investigations focus on individuals responding in vivo to profou=
nd traumas, and although Pennebaker reported some success in the laborat=
ory simulation of certain key aspects of this process, it is still true =
that phenomena observed in vivid field demonstrations remain elusive in =
controlled settings. This may be one way in which the laboratory paradig=
m can contribute. Our findings support the general idea that suppression=
can backfire, and at the same time, the results make this point without=
recourse to the major emotional traumas usually associated with such ef=
fects (cf. =
Rachman, 1980). The suppression results we have ob=
served suggest a straightforward cognitive mechanism mirroring, and perh=
aps underlying, a wide array of psychological phenomena: emotional, cogn=
itive, and behavioral as well.
It is yet an open question, of course, wheth=
er the suppression effects we have observed will generalize to items oth=
er than white bears. The nature of the thought being suppressed=E2=80=94=
whether it is emotional or not, easily imagined or not, familiar or not,=
complex or not, and the like=E2=80=94would seem to be an important dete=
rminant of suppression effects. The finding that an item as unremarkable=
as a white bear can yield suppression problems, however, suggests that =
the effects are at least not tied to any obvious stimulus qualities. Oth=
er points of concern for the validity of these findings center on the de=
gree to which the observed effects might be dependent on the imposition =
of the trappings of the laboratory on subjects' thought processes. Wheth=
er people do attempt by themselves to stop thinking (without our instruc=
tion to do so) and whether they then experience difficulty (when they ar=
e not being asked to verbalize or give another signal of their thought) =
at this point must remain unresolved issues. We can only remark on the m=
any striking resemblances between the observed effects and the everyday =
observations people make about the tenacity of their worries, addictions=
, crushes, and obsessions (see, e.g., =
Rachman & de Silva, 1978).
The observed processes, though fairly tame i=
n the laboratory, might conceivably create powerful mental preoccupation=
s in natural settings. This is because, in daily life, suppression attem=
pts and subsequent rebounds of thinking could occur repeatedly, escalati=
ng in response to each other, and so yield dramatically magnified effect=
s. A person might begin, perhaps only on a whim, to suppress a certain t=
hought. The suppression process might be difficult, but the person could=
probably arrive at successful suppression in a relatively brief period.=
Later on, however, some trigger for the rebound occurs and the person b=
ecomes involved in an excessive level of rumination. It is at this point=
that the person becomes alarmed, noticing that an unusual degree of pre=
occupation is underway. This might produce a newly energized attempt at =
suppression, only to restart the cycle. Suppression might be yet more di=
fficult at this time, but it could seem to be the only solution. Eventua=
lly, pathological levels of obsessive concern could result. A similar an=
alysis might be made of the processes of addiction. Attempts to control =
a habit such as smoking could take the form of thought suppression, and =
these in turn could prompt rebounds of excessive attention to the act of=
smoking. Cycles of suppression and preoccupation might then be standard=
fare for people who attempt to control an addiction in this way, result=
ing in repetitive abstinence and relapse.
On the practical side, then, perhaps it is f=
ortunate that our findings signal at least one possibility for relief fr=
om the ironic complications of thought suppression. Quite simply, it app=
ears that when suppression is transformed into an active interest in a s=
ingle distracter, the longer term dangers of a rebounding preoccupation =
with the suppressed thought may be prevented. Returning to a particular =
idea whenever one worries might provide some reduction in the eventual e=
xtent of the worrying. This procedure might prove to be of some use in t=
he elimination of obsessional thinking or addictive preoccupation. To be=
sure, however, the dimensions of this effect are only incompletely gras=
ped at this time, and the form of an adequate theory of successful suppr=
ession is not imaginable yet. Much more needs to be learned about the pa=
rameters of the paradoxical effects we have observed before we can sugge=
st with any confidence that they offer a proper analog of naturally occu=
rring processes. In the meantime, though, it seems clear that there is l=
ittle to be gained in trying not to think about it.
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Submitted: September 12, 1985 R=
evised: October 9, 1986 Accepted: November 3, 1986
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his publication is protected by US and international copyright laws and =
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Source: Jou=
rnal of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol.53 (1) US : American Psyc=
hological Association pp. 5-13.
Accession Number: psp-53-1-5 Digital Object Identifier: 10.1037=
/0022-3514.53.1.5